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1 Introduction
We oﬀer a new proof that the equilibrium manifold (under complete markets) identifies
individual demands.1 This same result has previously been obtained by Balasko (2004),
Chiappori et al. (2004) and Matzkin (2005). Balasko’s result has been criticized for its
assumption that equilibrium prices are observed for situations in which the incomes of
all individuals but one are zero. Under regularity assumptions, Chiappori et al. obtain
local identification of individual demands using local knowledge of the manifold. Balasko,
however, has claimed that the argument given by Chiappori et al. implicitly requires that
preferences be analytic. Matzkin determines the largest class of fundamentals for which
identification is possible.
We use Balasko’s idea on how to recover the aggregate demand function from the equi-
librium manifold, and hence avoid Chiappori et al.’s usage of the implicit function and the
Cartan-Kaehler theorems. We then use a slightly diﬀerent argument than Chiappori et
al. to identify individual demands from the aggregate demand function, so we also avoid
Balasko’s observational assumption.
2 The Model
Consider a profile of utility functions
¡
ui : RL++ −→ R
¢
i∈I , where I = {1, ..., I} is a finite
set of agents (a society) and L ≥ 2 is the number of commodities.
Condition 1 For each i ∈ I, ui represents locally nonsatiated and strictly convex prefer-
ences, is continuous and its upper-contour sets have interior closures.
Let SL−1++ = {p ∈ RL++ : p1 = 1} be the set of normalized prices and denote endowments
by
¡
wi
¢
i∈I ∈ R
LI
++. Individual demand functions are
¡
f i : SL−1++ ×RL++ → RL++
¢
i∈I , the
aggregate demand function is F : SL−1++ ×RLI++ → RL++ and the equilibrium manifold is
M =
(
(p,w) ∈ SL−1++ ×RLI++ : F (p,w) =
X
i∈I
wi
)
Notice that we maintain strictly positive endowments and that the equilibrium manifold
allows for variations in the aggregate endowment. In Balasko’s argument, behavior at null
endowments is used, unlike here. In Chiappori et al. the assumption of the observation of a
relatively open subset of the equilibrium manifold implies that the aggregate endowment is
allowed to vary as well: their argument allows for perturbations to each agent’s endowments,
keeping prices and the endowments of other consumers fixed (see Carvajal et al., 2004).
Henceforth, we maintain the assumption that there is a profile
¡
ui
¢
i∈I that satisfies
condition 1, and assume that some subset of its equilibrium manifold, M , is observed. We
1When the economy has generically complete real assets structures, we conjecture that our results hold
generically on prices and endowments.
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study whether unobserved fundamentals can be uniquely determined from that subset. We
do not test the existence of profile
¡
ui
¢
i∈I . Our results generalize Balasko’s theorem showing
thatM uniquely and globally determines aggregate demand F . We also consider the case in
which only a subset of M is observed and show that identification of F over a subset of its
domain is possible. Then, we show that F uniquely determines individual demands
¡
f i
¢
i∈I .
That is, we prove identification of individual demands from the equilibrium manifold. It
then follows from MasColell (1977) that individual preferences can also be identified.2
3 From the EquilibriumManifold to Aggregate Demand
Under our assumptions, it is well known that F is continuous and satisfies that¡
p · bwi = p · wi¢i∈I =⇒ F (p,w) = F (p, bw)
and that each f i satisfies Walras’s law.
For any Φ : SL−1++ ×RLI++ −→ RL++ and D ⊆ SL−1++ ×RLI++, denote by Φ|D the restriction
of Φ to D.
We say that E ⊆M identifies F over D ⊆ SL−1++ ×RLI++ if for every continuous function
Φ : SL−1++ ×RLI++ −→ RL++ that satisfies Walras’s law and is such that¡
p · bwi = p · wi¢i∈I =⇒ Φ(p,w) = Φ(p, bw)
and (
(p,w) ∈ SL−1++ ×RLI++
¯¯
Φ(p,w) =
X
i∈I
wi
)
⊇ E
it is true that Φ|D = F|D.
If in the previous definition we drop the requirement that Φ be continuous, then we say
that E strongly identifies F over D. Clearly, strong identification implies identification.
Intuitively, we say that E identifies F over D if, for any function that cannot be ruled
out as aggregate demand function, we have that, on the restricted domain D, that function
is identical to the true aggregate demand function. A function cannot be ruled out as
aggregate demand function when (i) it satisfies the properties that are necessary for it to
be an aggregate demand, and (ii) it is consistent with the observed data (because all the
observed equilibria are equilibrium according to it).
We say that the equilibrium manifold identifies (strongly identifies) aggregate
demand globally if M identifies (strongly identifies) F over SL−1++ × RLI++. It is straight-
forward that the equilibrium manifold identifies aggregate demand globally if and only if F
2The literature on integrability studies conditions under which it is possible to construct preferences that
rationalize a given demand function. It does not tell us when the preferences that rationalize a demand
function are unique, which MasColell (1977) does.
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is the only continuous function Φ : SL−1++ ×RLI++ −→ RL++, satisfying Walras’s law, such that¡
p · bwi = p · wi¢i∈I =⇒ Φ(p,w) = Φ(p, bw) and(
(p,w) ∈ SL−1++ ×RLI++
¯¯
Φ(p,w) =
X
i∈I
wi
)
=M
In the case of global identification, every function that satisfies the properties of an
aggregate demand can be ruled out, with the exception of the true aggregate demand.
Some properties of the concept of identification (strong identification) are straightfor-
ward.
Theorem 1 Let E ⊆ E ⊆ M , eE ⊆ M , D ⊆ bD ⊆ SL−1++ × RLI++ and eD ⊆ SL−1++ × RLI++.
Then,
1. If D ⊆ E, then E strongly identifies F over D.
2. If E identifies (strongly) F over bD , then it identifies (strongly) F over D.
3. If E identifies (strongly) F over D, then E identifies (strongly) F over D.
4. If E identifies (strongly) F over D and eE identifies (strongly) F over eD, then E ∪ eE
identifies (strongly) F over D ∪ eD.
5. If E identifies F over D, then it identifies F over the closure of D in SL−1++ × RLI++,
which we denote by D.
Proof. Fix Φ : SL−1++ × RLI++ −→ RL++ such that
¡
p · bwi = p · wi¢i∈I =⇒ Φ(p,w) =
Φ(p, bw) and © (p,w) ∈ SL−1++ ×RLI++¯¯Φ(p,w) =Pi∈I wiª ⊇ E and let (p,w) ∈ D.
If D ⊆ E, it follows that Φ(p,w) =
P
i∈I wi, whereas, since E ⊆M , F (p,w) =
P
i∈I wi,
which proves 1.
If E identifies F over bD, then Φ| bD = F| bD and since D ⊆ bD, obviously Φ|D = F|D,
proving 2.
If E identifies F over D, since E ⊆ E ⊆
©
(ep, ew) ∈ SL−1++ ×RLI++¯¯Φ(ep, ew) =Pi∈I ewiª, it
follows that Φ|D = F|D, proving 3.
Suppose that E and eE identify F over D and eD, respectively, and suppose that E∪ eE ⊆©
(ep, ew) ∈ SL−1++ ×RLI++¯¯Φ(ep, ew) =Pi∈I ewiª; then Φ|D = F|D and Φ| eD = F| eD, which implies
that Φ|D∪ eD = F|D∪ eD, proving 4.
Finally, suppose further that Φ is continuous and (p,w) ∈ D. Let (pn, wn)∞n=1 be a
sequence in DE converging to (p,w). If E identifies F over D, it follows that for every
n ∈ N, Φ (pn, wn) = F (pn, wn), and then, by continuity, Φ (p,w) = F (p,w).
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The key result is the following theorem, which generalizes the idea of Balasko.
Theorem 2 Let E ⊆M , and define
DE =
n
(p,w) ∈ SL−1++ ×RLI++
¯¯ ¡
∃ bw ∈ RLI++¢ : (p, bw) ∈ E and ¡p · bwi¢i∈I = ¡p · wi¢i∈Io
E identifies F over any D ⊆ DE, strongly over any D ⊆ DE.
Proof. By theorem 1, parts 2 and 5, it suﬃces to show that E strongly identifies F over
DE .
Let Φ : SL−1++ ×RLI++ −→ RL++ be such that
¡
p · bwi = p · wi¢i∈I =⇒ Φ(p,w) = Φ(p, bw) and©
(p,w) ∈ SL−1++ ×RLI++
¯¯
Φ(p,w) =
P
i∈I wi
ª
⊇ E. Fix (p,w) ∈ DE . By definition, we can
fix bw ∈ RLI++ such that (p, bw) ∈ E and p· bwi = p·wi for all i. Then, by construction, Φ(p,w) =
Φ(p, bw) and F (p, bw) = F (p,w). Since E ⊆ ©(ep, ew) ∈ SL−1++ ×RLI++¯¯Φ(ep, ew) =Pi∈I ewiª, it
follows that Φ(p, bw) =Pi∈I bwi, whereas since E ⊆M , F (p, bw) =Pi∈I bwi. It follows that
Φ(p,w) = F (p,w).
Corollary 1 (Balasko) The equilibrium manifold strongly identifies aggregate demand glob-
ally.
Proof. It suﬃces to show that for each (p,w) ∈ SL−1++ ×RLI++, there exists
¡ bwi¢i∈I ∈ RLI++
such that
³
p,
¡ bwi¢i∈I´ ∈ M and p · bwi = p · wi for all i. Let bwi = f i(p,wi) ∈ RL++. The
result follows by Walras’s Law and the fact that, then, bwi = f i(p, bwi).
Knowledge of the manifold for individual incomes arbitrarily close to zero may, however,
be unrealistic. In particular, suppose that K > 0 and define
MK =
©
(p,w) ∈M | (∀i ∈ I) : p · wi > Kª
Corollary 2 MK identifies F over DK =
©
(p,w) ∈ SL−1++ ×RLI++
¯¯
(∀i ∈ I) : p · wi > Kª.
Proof. It suﬃces to show that for each (p,w) ∈ DK , there exists
¡ bwi¢i∈I ∈ RLI++ such
that
³
p,
¡ bwi¢i∈I´ ∈MK and p · bwi = p · wi for all i. Again, let bwi = f i(p,wi) ∈ RL++. The
result follows by Walras’s Law, p · bwi = p · wi > K.
The largest domain on which, given E ⊆ M , strong identification is possible, is deter-
mined next.
Theorem 3 If E ⊆M strongly identifies F over D, then D ⊆ DE.
Proof. Denote by F2 (p,w) the second component of F (p,w) and define Φ : SL−1++ ×
RLI++ −→ RL++ by
Φ (p,w) =
½ F (p,w) , if (p,w) ∈ DE
F (p,w) + F2(p,w)2
£
p2 −1 0 · · · 0
¤> , if (p,w) /∈ DE
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Φ is well defined: it maps into RL++, satisfies Walras’s law,
¡
p · bwi = p · wi¢i∈I =⇒
Φ(p,w) = Φ(p, bw) and © (p,w) ∈ SL−1++ ×RLI++¯¯Φ(p,w) =Pi∈I wiª ⊇ E, because DE∩M ⊇
E.
Suppose that there is (p,w) ∈ D\DE . Then, by definition, Φ2 (p,w) = F2(p,w)2 , and, since
(p,w) ∈ D and E identifies F over D then Φ (p,w) = F (p,w), implying that F2 (p,w) = 0,
which is impossible.
Identification, however, requires a more involved argument, which assumes compactness
of E. We present that argument in Appendix A1. This theorem determines the largest
restriction of the domain over which identification of aggregate demand is possible. The
“dual” question of how small a subset of the manifold can be if it is to allow for identification
of the aggregate demand over a given subset of its domain, which is of lesser empirical
relevance, is dealt with in Appendix A2.
Theorem 4 If E ⊆M is compact and identifies F over D, then D ⊆ DE.
Proof. See Appendix A1.
4 From Aggregate Demand to Individual Demands
If, contrary to our assumption, equilibrium prices are observable for situations in which the
incomes of all individuals but one are zero, the argument above still holds and then it is
straightforward that aggregate demand identifies individual demands: for all i, f i(p,wi) =
F (p, (0,0, ..., wi, ...,0)). That argument, however, has been criticized by Chiappori et al.
(2004): if observation of situations in which the endowments of all consumers but one
are pegged at zero is possible, then the section of the manifold at that boundary is that
one consumer’s inverse demand. In our case, an immediate argument for identification of
individual demands can obviously still be made by taking sequences of endowments that
converge to zero for all individuals but one, for whom the endowment is kept constant,3 but
that argument would fail when, for example, only MK is observed.
We now show that, under an additional assumption, one can identify individual demands,
without resorting to boundary analysis. Our proof is somewhat similar to the one presented
by Chiappori et al., but simpler in the sense that it does not need to invoke the Cartan-
Kaehler theorem. As a consequence, for us it suﬃces that only the first few derivatives of
the demand exist, so analyticity is not required.
For the sake of simplicity, we initially study the global setting introduced in the previ-
ous section. The case in which the aggregate demand is not globally known is presented
afterwards.
3A referee expressed concern for this fact, which motivated us to develop corollary 2. We thank her or
him for the observation.
5Carvajal and Riascos: Identification of Preferences
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005
4.1 The global case:
In this case, we can weaken Chiappori et al.’s regularity assumption as follows:
Condition 2 (Regularity) For every individual i, ui ∈ C4
¡
RL++
¢
and is diﬀerentiably
strictly concave, and for every p ∈ SL−1++ , there exist w ∈ RL++, and l, l0 ∈ {1, ..., L} \ {1},
such that ∂
2fil
∂(wi1)
2 6= 0 and ¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ ∂
2fil
∂(wi1)
2 (p,w) ∂
2fil0
∂(wi1)
2 (p,w)
∂3fil
∂(wi1)
3 (p,w) ∂
3fil0
∂(wi1)
3 (p,w)
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ 6= 0
The previous condition is weaker not only because of the lower degree of diﬀerentiability
required, but also because w only needs an existential, and not a universal, quantifier. The
condition is indeed restrictive as it requires, for example, that income eﬀects do not vanish.
It also requires that there be at least three commodities. Intuitively, the condition requires
that preferences be “complex enough” so as to generate the independence of income eﬀects.
As Chiappori et al. have pointed out, it suﬃces that individual demands have rank at
least two for the condition to be met everywhere. Appendix A3, at the end of the paper,
illustrates the point.
Under condition 2, each f i ∈ C3
¡
SL−1++ ×RL++
¢
and further satisfies Slutsky symmetry.
By definition
¡
f i
¢
i∈I is such that
P
i∈I f i = F .
We say that aggregate demand globally identifies individual demands if, given F ,¡
f i
¢
i∈I is the only profile of functions
¡
ϕi : SL−1++ ×RL++ → RL++ ∈ C3
¡
SL−1++ ×RL++
¢¢
i∈I ,
satisfying Walras’s law and Slutsky symmetry, and such that
P
i∈I ϕi = F .
Theorem 5 Aggregate demand identifies individual demands.
Proof. Let
¡
ϕi : SL−1++ ×RL++ → RL++ ∈ C3
¡
SL−1++ ×RL++
¢¢
i∈I satisfy Walras’s law and
Slutsky symmetry and be such that F =
P
i∈I ϕi. Fix i ∈ I and define θi : SL−1++ ×RL++ −→
RL and γi : SL−1++ −→ RL by θi (p,w) = F (p, (1,1, ..., w, ..., 1)), where w occupies the ith
position, and γi (p) = −
P
j∈I\{i} ϕj (p,1).4
By Slutsky symmetry, for every l, l0 ∈ {1, ..., L} \ {1}, everywhere in SL−1++ ×RL++,
∂ϕil
∂pl0
+
¡
ϕil0 − wil0
¢ ∂ϕil
∂wi1
=
∂ϕil0
∂pl
+
¡
ϕil − wil
¢ ∂ϕil0
∂wi1
Since ϕi
¡
p,wi
¢
= θi
¡
p,wi
¢
+ γi (p), substituting,
∂θil
∂pl0
+
∂γil
∂pl0
+
¡
θil0 + γil0 − wil0
¢ ∂θil
∂wi1
=
∂θil0
∂pl
+
∂γil0
∂pl
+
¡
θil + γil − wil
¢ ∂θil0
∂wi1
4This is the step that simplifies the proof of Chiappori et al.
6 Advances in Theoretical Economics Vol. 5 [2005], No. 1, Article 3
http://www.bepress.com/bejte/advances/vol5/iss1/art3
Fix p ∈ SL−1++ . Taking that l, l0 6= 1 and deriving once and twice with respect to wi1 gives
∂2θil
∂wi1∂pl0
+
¡
θil0 + γil0 − wil0
¢ ∂2θil
∂
¡
wi1
¢2 = ∂2θil0∂wi1∂pl + ¡θil + γil − wil¢ ∂
2θil0
∂
¡
wi1
¢2
and
∂3θil
∂
¡
wi1
¢2 ∂pl0 + ∂θ
i
l0
∂wi1
∂2θil
∂
¡
wi1
¢2 + ¡θil0 + γil0 − wil0¢ ∂3θil∂ ¡wi1¢3 =
∂3θil0
∂
¡
wi1
¢2 ∂pl + ∂θ
i
l
∂wi1
∂2θil0
∂
¡
wi1
¢2 + ¡θil + γil − wil¢ ∂3θil0∂ ¡wi1¢3
which rewrites as (recall that p is fixed)
∆l,l0
¡
wi
¢ · γil0 (p)
γil (p)
¸
= Γl,l0
¡
wi
¢
where
∆l,l0
¡
wi
¢
=


∂2θil
∂(wi1)
2
¡
p,wi
¢
− ∂
2θil0
∂(wi1)
2
¡
p,wi
¢
∂3θil
∂(wi1)
3
¡
p,wi
¢
− ∂
3θil0
∂(wi1)
3
¡
p,wi
¢


and Γl,l0
¡
wi
¢
is


∂2θil0
∂wi1∂pl
− ∂
2θil
∂wi1∂pl0
+
¡
θil − wil
¢ ∂2θil0
∂(wi1)
2 −
¡
θil0 − wil0
¢ ∂2θil
∂(wi1)
2
∂3θil0
∂(wi1)
2∂pl
− ∂
3θil
∂(wi1)
2∂pl0
+
∂θil
∂wi1
∂2θil0
∂(wi1)
2 − ∂θ
i
l0
∂wi1
∂2θil
∂(wi1)
2 +
¡
θil − wil
¢ ∂3θil0
∂(wi1)
3 −
¡
θil0 − wil0
¢ ∂3θil
∂(wi1)
3


Notice that the resulting ∆l,l0
¡
wi
¢
and Γl,l0
¡
wi
¢
do not contain γil0 or γil0 , but only θ
i,
which is determined by F .
By regularity, for some wi ∈ RL+ and l, l0 ∈ {1, ..., L}, ∆l,l0
¡
wi
¢
is invertible, so·
γil0 (p)
γil (p)
¸
=
¡
∆l,l0
¡
wi
¢¢−1
Γl,l0
¡
wi
¢
(*)
whereas, for every other l00 ∈ {1, ..., L} \ {1}, by Slutsky symmetry,
γil00 (p) =
∂2θil00
∂wi1∂pl
− ∂
2θil
∂wi1∂pl00
+
¡
θil
¡
p,wi
¢
+ γil (p)− wil
¢ ∂2θil00
∂(wi1)
2 −
¡
θil00
¡
p,wi
¢
− wil00
¢ ∂2θil
∂(wi1)
2
∂2θil
∂(wi1)
2
and, by Walras’s law, γi1 (p) = −
PL
l00=2 pl00γil00 (p).
Since ϕi
¡
p,wi
¢
= θi
¡
p,wi
¢
+γi (p) and the expression on the right hand side of equation
(*) depends only on F , it follows that ϕil = f il , which implies that ϕi = f i.
It follows that
¡
ϕi
¢I
i=1 =
¡
f i
¢I
i=1.
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4.2 Restricted observation
It must be noticed that the choice of
¡
wj
¢
j∈I\{i} = (1)j∈I\{i} in the proof of theorem 5
is arbitrary and that in the local case, or when only F|D is available, such choice can be
modified as needed.
In the case in which only MK has been observed, and hence F has been identified only
over DK , condition 2 needs to be strengthened to require that p · w > K. If only local
information of F is available, one must strengthen the second part of the assumption so
that the profile of endowments at which the condition is met lies in the observed domain. In
any case, C4 still suﬃces. For the sake of simplicity, assume that we strengthen condition
2 by substituting the existential quantifier of w by the universal quantifier.
Let D ⊆ SL−1++ ×RLI++ and, for every i, let Di ⊆ SL−1++ ×RL++. We say that F|D identifies¡
f i
¢
i∈I over
¡
Di
¢
i∈I if for every
¡
ϕi : SL−1++ ×RL++ −→ RL++
¢
i∈I , satisfying Walras’s law,¡
p · bwi = p · wi¢i∈I =⇒ ¡ϕi(p,wi)¢i∈I = ¡ϕi(p, bwi)¢i∈I and Slutsky symmetry, and such
that (
(p,w) ∈ SL−1++ ×RLI++
¯¯¯¯
¯X
i∈I
ϕi
¡
p,wi
¢
= F (p,w)
)
⊇ D
it is true that
³
ϕi|Di
´
i∈I
=
³
f i|Di
´
i∈I
.
Intuitively, we say that F|D identifies
¡
f i
¢
i∈I over
¡
Di
¢
i∈I if, for any profile of functions
that cannot be ruled out as individual demands, we have that, on the restricted domains¡
Di
¢
i∈I , those functions are identical to the true demand functions. A profile of functions
cannot be ruled out as individual demands when (i) it satisfies the properties that are
necessary for a profile of individual demands, and (ii) it is consistent with the observed data
(because at all observed prices and endowments, the aggregate of the functions equals the
observed aggregate demand).
Theorem 6 Let D ⊆ SL−1++ ×RLI++ and, for each i ∈ I, denote
Di =
©
(p,wi) ∈ SL−1++ ×RL++ |(∃ (bp, bw) ∈ D0) : bp = p and bp · bwi = bp · wiª
where D0 is the interior of D. F|D identifies
¡
f i
¢
i∈I over
¡
Di
¢
i∈I.
Proof. Fix
¡
ϕi : SL−1++ ×RL++ −→ RL++
¢
i∈I , satisfying Walras’s law and Slutsky sym-
metry, and such that for every (p,w) ∈ D,
P
i∈I ϕi
¡
p,wi
¢
= F (p,w).
Fix i ∈ I and ¡p,wi¢ ∈ Di0, whereDi0 is the projection ofD0 into the space of ¡p,wi¢. By
definition, there exists
¡
wj
¢
j∈I\{i} such that
³
p,
¡
wj
¢I
j=1
´
∈ D0. Since D0 is open, there
exists  > 0 such that
©
(ep, ew) ∈ SL−1++ ×RLI++¯¯ k(ep, ew)− (p,w)k < ª ⊆ D0. Denote O =© ep ∈ SL−1++ ¯¯ kep− pk < ª and Oi = ©¡ep, ewi¢ ∈ SL−1++ ×RL++ ¯¯ °°¡ep, ewi¢− ¡p,wi¢°° < ª, and
define θi : Oi −→ RL and γi : O −→ RL, as θi
¡ep, ewi¢ = F ¡ep, ¡w1, w2, ..., ewi, ..., wI¢¢, where
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ewi occupies the ith position, and γi (ep) = −Pj∈I\{i} ϕj ¡ep,wj¢. By Slutsky symmetry and
regularity, as in the proof of theorem 5, ϕi
¡
p,wi
¢
= f i
¡
p,wi
¢
.
Now, let
¡
p, wi
¢
∈ Di. By definition, there exists
¡
pn, win
¢∞
n=1 such that
¡
pn, win
¢
→¡
p,wi
¢
and, for each n ∈ N, there exists ewn ∈ RLI++ such that (pn, ewn) ∈ D0 and pn · ewin = pn ·
win. Therefore, ϕi
¡
pn, ewin¢ = ϕi ¡pn, win¢ and f i ¡pn, ewin¢ = f i ¡pn, win¢ and, by continuity,
ϕi
¡
pn, ewin¢ = ϕi ¡pn, win¢ → ϕi ¡p, wi¢ and f i ¡pn, ewin¢ = f i ¡pn, win¢ → f i ¡p, wi¢. Since¡
pn, ewin¢ ∈ Di0, it follows from our previous argument that ϕi ¡pn, ewin¢ = f i ¡pn, ewin¢, and
hence that ϕi
¡
p, wi
¢
= f i
¡
p,wi
¢
.
5 Concluding remarks
We oﬀer a new proof that the equilibrium manifold identifies individual demands. We do
so by combining the ideas of Balasko (2004) and Chiappori et al. (2004) in such a way that
we avoid Balasko’s argument at the boundary of the space of endowments and Chiappori et
al.’s analyticity assumption. We also believe that our proof retains much of the simplicity
that distinguishes Balasko’s argument from Chiappori et al.’s more involved idea.
This result is surprising as it implies that the belief derived from the Sonnenschein-
Mantel-Debreu result suggesting that all the structure imposed by individual rationality
disappears upon aggregation lacks foundation. The fundamental questions that remain
open in this literature, namely to what extent the result extends to more realistic economies
(e.g. with production or with externalities) or more realistic data sets (e.g. a path of
endowments and equilibrium prices in a dynamic economy) are not addressed by the paper.
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Appendix A1: proof of theorem 4
Lemma 1 If E is compact, then DE = DE.
Proof. Let (pn, wn)∞n=1 be a sequence defined in DE such that (pn, wn) −→ (p,w).
By definition, there exists ( bwn)∞n=1 such that (pn, bwn)∞n=1 is a sequence in E such that¡
pn · bwin¢∞n=1 = ¡pn · win¢∞n=1 for all i. Since E is compact, we can take a convergent sub-
sequence
¡
pk(n), bwk(n)¢∞n=1 such that ¡pk(n), bwk(n)¢ −→ (p, bw) ∈ E for some bw ∈ RLI++. By
construction, pk(n) ·wk(n) −→ p ·w, while pk(n) · bwk(n) −→ p · bw. Since ¡pk(n) · bwk(n)¢∞n=1 =¡
pk(n) · wk(n)
¢∞
n=1, it follows that p · w = p · bw.
With the previous lemma, we can simply prove that D ⊆ DE , as follows:
Proof of Theorem 4. Suppose that D * DE . Let (p, w) ∈ D\DE . Since, by the
lemma, DE is closed, we know that for some δ > 0, Bδ (p)×
Q
i∈I Bδ
¡
wi
¢
⊆ (DE)c, where
(DE)c denotes the complement of DE in SL−1++ ×RLI++.
Define the following sets:
K =
n
(p, k) ∈ SL−1++ × RI++
¯¯
(∃ (bp, bw) ∈ E) : bp = p & ¡bp · bwi¢i∈I = ko
K =
½
(p, k) ∈ SL−1++ ×RI++
¯¯ µ
∃ (bp, bw) ∈ B δ
2
(p)× Q
i∈I
B δ
2
¡
wi
¢¶
: bp = p & ¡bp · bwi¢i∈I = k¾
K = K ∪
µ
SL−1++ ×
µQ
i∈I
³
ki, ki
´¶c¶
where for each i,
ki = min
(p,w)∈Bδ(p)×Bδ(wi)
p · w
ki = max
(p,w)∈Bδ(p)×Bδ(wi)
p · w
Since E is compact, K and, hence, K are closed. Similarly, K is closed.
We divide the proof in four consecutive steps.
Step 1: We first prove that K ∩K = φ.
Suppose that (p, k) ∈ K ∩ K. Since K ∩ K =K ∩ K ∪
³
SL−1++ ×
³Q
i∈I
³
ki, ki
´´c´
∩
K, then (p, k) ∈ K ∩ K or (p, k) ∈
³
SL−1++ ×
³Q
i∈I
³
ki, ki
´´c´
∩ K. If (p, k) ∈ K ∩ K,
then, there exist bw, ew ∈ RLI++, such that (p, bw) ∈ E, (p, ew) ∈ B δ
2
(p) ×Qi∈I B δ2 ¡wi¢ and¡
p · bwi¢i∈I = ¡p · ewi¢i∈I , which is impossible because Bδ (p) × Qi∈I Bδ ¡wi¢ ⊆ DcE . If
(p, k) ∈
³
SL−1++ ×
³Q
i∈I
³
ki, ki
´´c´
∩K then k ∈
³Q
i∈I
³
ki, ki
´´c
and there exists (p, ew) ∈
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B δ
2
(p) ×Qi∈I B δ2 ¡wi¢ such that ¡p · ewi¢i∈I = ¡ki¢i∈I . By the second implication, since
(p, ew) ∈ B δ
2
(p)×Qi∈I B δ2 ¡wi¢ then (p, ew) ∈ Bδ (p)×Qi∈I Bδ ¡wi¢ therefore ¡p · ewi¢i∈I ∈³Q
i∈I
³
ki, ki
´´
a contradiction.
Step 2: We now construct a function Φ.
Define d : SL−1++ ×RI++ −→ R++ by
d (p, k) = F2
µ
p,
µ
ki
p · 11
¶
i∈I
¶
which is continuous, and fix
0 < r < min
(p,k)∈Bδ(p)×
Q
i∈I
h
ki,ki
i d (p, k)
Since K and K are closed disjoint sets (step 1) one can construct a continuous function,
∆1 : SL−1++ ×RI++ −→ [0, r], such that:
(∀ (p, k) ∈ K) : ∆1 (p, k) = 0
(∀ (p, k) ∈ Kc) : ∆1 (p, k) 6= 0
(∀ (p, k) ∈ K) : ∆1 (p, k) = r
For the same reason we can define a continuous function ∆0 : SL−1++ −→ [0, 1] such that
(∀p ∈ Bδ (p)c) : ∆0 (p) = 0
(∀p ∈ Bδ (p)) : ∆0 (p) 6= 0³
∀p ∈ B δ
2
(p)
´
: ∆0 (p) = 1
Finally, define Φ : SL−1++ ×RLI++ −→ RL as
Φ (p,w) = F (p,w) +∆0 (p)∆1
³
p,
¡
p · wi¢i∈I´ £ p2 −1 0 · · · 0 ¤>
Step 3: We now prove that Φ is well defined: it maps into RL++, is continuous, satisfies
Walras’s law,
¡
p · wi = p · bwi¢i∈I =⇒ Φ(p,w) = Φ(p, bw) and
E ⊆
(
(p,w) ∈ SL−1++ ×RLI++
¯¯
Φ(p,w) =
X
i∈I
wi
)
By construction, Φ is obviously continuous and satisfies Walras’s law. To show that
it is well defined suppose that (p,w) is such that Φ (p,w) 6= F (p,w). By construction
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∆0 (p)∆1
³
p,
¡
p · wi¢i∈I´ 6= 0 therefore, p ∈ Bδ (p) and ³p, ¡p · wi¢i∈I´ /∈ K. By definition
of K this implies ¡p · wi¢i∈IQi∈I hki, kii, therefore, ³p, ¡p · wi¢i∈I´ ∈ Bδ (p)×Qi∈I hki, kii
and, hence, d
³
p,
¡
p · wi¢i∈I´ > r. Now, sinceµ
p ·
µ
p · wi
p · 1 1
¶¶
i∈I
=
¡
p · wi¢i∈I
it follows that
Φ2 (p,w) = F2 (p,w)−∆0 (p)∆1
³
p,
¡
p · wi¢i∈I´
= F2
µ
p,
µ
p · wi
p · 1 1
¶
i∈I
¶
−∆0 (p)∆1
³
p,
¡
p · wi¢i∈I´
= d
³
p,
¡
p · wi¢i∈I´−∆0 (p)∆1 ³p, ¡p · wi¢i∈I´
> r −∆0 (p)∆1
³
p,
¡
p · wi¢i∈I´
≥ 0
since, by construction, ∆0 (p)∆1
³
p,
¡
p · wi¢i∈I´ ≤ r. This proves that Φ maps into RL++.
Now, let (p,w) ∈ E. By construction,
³
p,
¡
p · wi¢i∈I´ ∈ K and, hence, Φ (p,w) =
F (p,w)whereas F (p,w) =
P
i∈I wi. Then, E ⊆
©
(p,w) ∈ SL−1++ ×RLI++
¯¯
Φ(p,w) =
P
i∈I wi
ª
.
Step 4: Finally, using that Φ|D = F|D, we derive a contradiction.
Since (p,w) ∈ D, p ∈ B δ
2
(p) and
³
p,
¡
p · wi¢i∈I´ ∈ K, therefore F2 (p, w) = Φ2 (p, w),
∆0 (p) = 1 and ∆1
³
p,
¡
p · wi¢i∈I´ = r. Hence,
F2 (p, w) = Φ2 (p, w)
= F2 (p, w)−∆0 (p)∆1
³
p,
¡
p · wi¢i∈I´
= F2 (p, w)− r
< F2 (p, w)
Appendix A2: duality
Given D ⊆ SL−1++ ×RLI++, define
ED =
n
(p,w) ∈M | ¡∃ ew ∈ RLI++¢ : (p, ew) ∈ D and ¡f i ¡p, ewi¢¢i∈I = wo
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Theorem 7 For any D ⊆ SL−1++ ×RLI++, ED identifies F over D.
Proof. It suﬃces to show that D ⊆ DED . Let (p,w) ∈ D, bw = ¡f i ¡p,wi¢¢i∈I andew = w. It is straightforward that (p, bw) ∈M and that (p, ew) ∈ D and ¡f i ¡p, ewi¢¢i∈I = bw,
so (p, bw) ∈ ED. Moreover, since ¡p · bwi¢i∈I = ¡p · wi¢i∈I , it follows that (p,w) ∈ DED .
Even if D is compact, it is not true that if E identifies F over D, then E ⊇ ED However,
Theorem 8 For any D ⊆ SL−1++ ×RLI++, if E, compact, identifies F over D, then for every
(p,w) ∈ ED there exists
¡
δi
¢
i∈I ∈
³
[p]⊥
´I
such that
P
i∈I δ
i = 0 and (p,w + δ) ∈ E.
Proof. Since E is compact, it follows from theorem 4 that D ⊆ DE . Fix (p,w) ∈ ED ⊆
M . By definition, there exists ew ∈ RLI++ such that(p, ew) ∈ D and ¡f i ¡p, ewi¢¢i∈I = w. Since
D ⊆ DE , it follows that for some bw ∈ RLI++, (p, bw) ∈ E and ¡p · bwi¢i∈I = ¡p · ewi¢i∈I . Define
δi = bwi−wi, for each i. That (p,w + δ) ∈ E is immediate. Also, since p·δi = p·¡ bwi − wi¢ =
p · bwi−p ·f i ¡p, ewi¢ = 0, because p · bwi = p · ewi, it follows that ¡δi¢i∈I ∈ ³[p]⊥´I . Then, since
(p,w) , (p, bw) ∈M , it is immediate thatPi∈I δi =Pi∈I ¡ bwi − wi¢ =Pi∈I bwi−Pi∈I wi =
F (p, bw)− F (p, ew) = 0, because ¡p · bwi¢i∈I = ¡p · ewi¢i∈I .
Appendix A3: an example of regularity
Consider a particular case of a deflated income demand system (see Lewbel, 2003, and Banks
et al., 1997) for three commodities, l = 1, 2, 3:
fl(p,m) =
m
pl
Ã
Al(p) +Bl(p) log
µ
m
a(p)
¶
+ Cl(p) log
µ
m
a(p)
¶2!
where m denotes income, which suﬃces for the purposes of the example, Al, Bl and Cl are
homogeneous of degree zero in p and a is homogeneous of degree 1 in p ∈ R3++ (these two
conditions guarantee that fl is homogeneous of degree zero in p and w) and
3X
l=1
Al(p) +
3X
l=1
Bl(p) log
µ
m
a(p)
¶
+
3X
l=1
Cl(p) log
µ
m
a(p)
¶2
= 1
for all p and m.
Now, the rank of system f (p,m) is, by definition, the rank of:


A1(p) B1(p) C1(p)
A2(p) B2(p) C2(p)
A3(p) B3(p) C3(p)


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If Bl and Cl are zero then the system is of rank 1, the utility function is homothetic and
clearly the regularity condition does not hold. If B2 (p)C3 (p)−B2 (p)C3 (p) 6= 0 the system
has rank at least 2. Below, we prove that, for this case, the regularity condition holds.
Restricting p to S2++,
∂fl
∂m (p,m) =
1
pl
Ã
Al(p) +Bl(p) log
µ
m
a(p)
¶
+ Cl(p) log
µ
m
a(p)
¶2!
+
1
pl
µ
Bl(p) + 2Cl(p) log
µ
m
a(p)
¶¶
∂2fl
∂m2 (p,m) =
1
plm
µ
Bl(p) + 2Cl(p)
µ
log
µ
m
a(p)
¶
+ 1
¶¶
∂3f1
∂m3 (p,m) = −
1
pl (m)2
µ
Bl(p) + 2Cl(p) log
µ
m
a(p)
¶¶
It follows that the regularity condition is satisfied if¯¯¯¯
¯¯ 1p2m
³
B2(p) + 2C2(p)
³
log
³
m
a(p)
´
+ 1
´´
1
p3m
³
B3(p) + 2C3(p)
³
log
³
m
a(p)
´
+ 1
´´
− 1p2m2
³
B2(p) + 2C2(p) log
³
m
a(p)
´´
− 1p3m2
³
B3(p) + 2C3(p) log
³
m
a(p)
´´ ¯¯¯¯¯¯ 6= 0
⇔
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
³
B2(p) + 2C2(p)
³
log
³
m
a(p)
´
+ 1
´´ ³
B3(p) + 2C3(p)
³
log
³
m
a(p)
´
+ 1
´´³
B2(p) + 2C2(p) log
³
m
a(p)
´´ ³
B3(p) + 2C3(p) log
³
m
a(p)
´´ ¯¯¯¯¯¯ 6= 0
⇔
¯¯¯¯
¯ C2(p) C3(p)³B2(p) + 2C2(p) log³ ma(p)´´ ³B3(p) + 2C3(p) log³ ma(p)´´
¯¯¯¯
¯ 6= 0
⇔ C2(p)B3(p)− C3(p)B2(p) 6= 0
A rank 3 system clearly satisfies this condition and, if the condition is satisfied, then the
rank is at least 2.
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